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The paper uses a cross-country dataset to investigate the determinants of individual attitudes
towards immigration. There are three main conclusions. The first is that attitudes towards
immigration are not a function of economic interests alone; rather, they also reflect nationalist
sentiment among respondents. The second is that for labour market participants, standard economic
theory does a good job of predicting individual attitudes towards immigration. The high-skilled are
less opposed to immigration than the low-skilled, and this effect is greater in richer countries than in
poorer countries, consistent with Heckscher-Ohlin theory; and in more equal countries than in more
unequal ones (consistent with the Borjas theory of immigrant self-selection). On the other hand, non-
economic factors are much more important in determining the attitudes of those not in the labour
force.
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1. Introduction
Standard economic theory suggests that the gains to free migration could be enormous. The logic
is straightforward: transfer a worker from a low wage (i.e. low marginal productivity) economy to a high-
wage (high marginal productivity) economy, and the world gains the difference between the wages in the
two regions. Since international wage gaps are huge, the benefits would be substantial: according to one
general equilibrium estimate, freeing up world migration could double world income (Hamilton and
Whalley 1984), a gain that leaves the much-trumpeted estimated benefits of world trade deals in the
shade. Host countries gain as well as the world as a whole, although the estimated net welfare benefits
derived from partial equilibrium models are typically quite small (Borjas 1995). Despite the compelling
economic arguments in favour of migration, however, governments tend to restrict immigration in
practice. In 2001, 21 out of 48 developed country governments had policies designed to reduce
immigration, while only 2 had policies designed to raise it (UN 2002, Table 3, p. 18). What are the
underlying causes of this apparent paradox?
In democracies, government policies will largely reflect the individual preferences of voters.
There are at least two reasons why voters might not want immigration. The first is non-economic: racism,
xenophobia, or milder forms of nationalist sentiment might lead voters to reject the presence of
foreigners. The second is economic: voters’ attitudes towards immigration might depend on their
economic interests, with those who benefit as a result of immigration supporting it, and those who are
economically hurt by immigration opposing it.
In a paper examining the growing restrictiveness of late 19
th century immigration policy, Timmer
and Williamson (1998) argued that economic factors were sufficient to explain the anti-immigration
backlash that occurred in the major host countries of the New World at that time. This backlash was
manifested in such legislation as head taxes, Chinese exclusion acts, the definition of various categories
of persons as ‘excludable’, and so on. Timmer and Williamson constructed an index of immigration2
barriers in the US, Canada, Argentina, Australia and Brazil from 1850 to 1930, based on a careful
reading of each country’s immigration legislation. They then regressed this policy measure on a number
of explanatory variables, and found that the most consistently significant variable explaining the rise in
immigration barriers was economic inequality: regardless of what else was included in the regression
equation, rising equality encouraged more open immigration policies, while rising inequality encouraged
more restrictive immigration policies.
Other economic variables also seem to have mattered for policy: high real wage levels were
associated with liberal policy in some countries, high real wage growth in others. Low and falling
immigrant ‘quality’, as measured by real wages in source countries, induced immigration restrictions.
There is also evidence of policy spillovers during the period: for example, Argentinian policy tended to
mimic policy in Australia, Canada and Brazil. However, Timmer and Williamson found no evidence that
widening ethnicity gaps between immigrants and host country populations were responsible for tighter
controls: policy was well explained by the economic effects of immigration, and by policy overseas.
Once other variables have been controlled for, there was no independent role for xenophobia, of the sort
frequently stressed by qualitative histories of the period.
Does this conclusion still hold? We want to take seriously the potential roles of both economic
and non-economic factors in determining attitudes towards immigration. In particular, we explore the
possibility that anti-immigrant preferences may in part be a function of strong feelings of national
identity and an associated set of patriotic and nationalist attitudes that include pride in country, sense of
national superiority and, at the extreme, antagonistic attitudes towards those who are not part of the
nation. Of course, nationalist ideology may have its origins in a conjuncture between identity and group
interests, and particularly in a conjuncture between identity and perceptions of inequality (Gellner 1983);
the point here, however, is that, whatever their origins, nationalist attitudes are likely to have a certain
autonomy and may exercise an independent influence on the way in which individuals react to3
immigration and to other globalization issues.
Our paper also differs from Timmer and Williamson (1998) in the research strategy pursued.
Rather than examining the determinants of government policy per se, we look at the determinants of
individual voters’ attitudes towards immigration, using cross-country survey data. In so doing, we are
following in the footsteps of Scheve and Slaughter (2001a), who used survey data to tackle the question
of who is in favor of immigration, and why. As Scheve and Slaughter (citing Rodrik, 1995) point out in
another paper, individual-level preferences regarding trade must lie at the heart of any rational choice
account of policy-formation, but using aggregate data provides only indirect information on agents’
preferences, since “policy preferences and institutions together determine policy actions, so the mapping
from preferences to actions is not unambiguous” (Scheve and Slaughter 2001b, p. 4). However, Scheve
and Slaughter looked at survey data for just one country, the US. As will be emphasized later, cross-
country data are required to properly test various economic hypotheses regarding the determinants of
attitudes towards immigration.
The paper is closest in spirit to previous work that we, and Mayda and Rodrik, have done on the
determinants of individual attitudes towards trade (Mayda and Rodrik 2001, O’Rourke and Sinnott
2001). Since beginning this current work, we have become aware of the independent work of Mayda
(2003) which raises many (but not all) of the same issues as this paper, and which uses the same dataset.
Since Mayda’s study differs from ours in various respects, her results serve as a robustness check on
several of our key conclusions.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 asks what standard economic theory has to say
about the determinants of attitudes towards immigration. Section 3 introduces the survey data set which
we use, and indicates how we test the possibility that nationalism matters for individual voter attitudes.
Section 4 reports the results of ordered probit regressions asking what are the determinants of individual
attitudes towards immigrants in general, as well as refugees in particular. It also reports a number of4
bivariate probit regressions which allow us to simultaneously explore the determinants of trade and
immigration. Section 5 concludes.
Section 2. Theory
Labour demand curves slope downwards, and immigration lowers wages (Borjas 2003): this is
the basic economic fact which leads people to oppose immigration. Whose wages should be lowered,
however, depends on the composition of immigration: low-skilled immigration should be opposed by
low-skilled workers, while high-skilled immigration should be opposed by high-skilled workers. What
then determines whether it is the high-skilled or the low-skilled who are more opposed to immigration?
Standard Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory is quite clear in its predictions regarding who should
benefit and who should lose from free trade in commodities. Imagine a two factor world in which
countries are distinguished only by their relative endowments of skilled and unskilled workers. The
relative wages of skilled workers will be lower, other things being equal, in skill-abundant countries
(which we will denote by R, and refer to as rich countries) than in unskilled-labor-abundant countries
(denoted by P, and referred to as poor countries): we have (wS/wUS)
R < (wS/wUS)
P, where wS and wUS
denote skilled and unskilled wages respectively. It is this inequality that drives comparative advantage:
the rich countries will export skill intensive goods, while the poor countries will export unskilled labor
intensive goods. The result is relative factor price convergence (or, in the limit, factor price equalization):
when countries move towards freer trade, the relative price of skilled labor rises in rich countries, and
falls in poor countries. Moreover, the abundant factor gains in real terms in all countries, while the scarce
factor loses. Thus the skilled should favor free trade in rich countries, while they should favor protection
in poor countries; the unskilled in rich countries should favor protection, while the unskilled in poor
countries should support free trade.
In a pure Heckscher-Ohlin world in which technology is identical across countries, and in which1 The implicit assumption here is that GDP per capita is positively correlated with countries’
human capital endowments. Alternatively, we could have used the Barro and Lee (2000) data set on
schooling; however, for the sample of countries used here (see section 3) this would be inappropriate.The
Barro-Lee figures for schooling in several transition countries are very high: for example, average
schooling according to these data is higher in Slovakia, Bulgaria, Latvia and Poland than in the
Netherlands, Ireland, and Austria. We doubt whether these figures provide a genuine reflection of the
economically relevant human capital endowments of these economies, and prefer to use GDP per capita
as a proxy for skill abundance.
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countries are only distinguished by their relative endowments of skilled and unskilled labor, it is again
possible to make unambiguous predictions about who should favor immigration and who should not. This
is the case, even though international migration is not driven by comparative advantage and relative
factor prices, but by absolute advantage, and by absolute factor price differentials. In a pure HO world,
the real wages of skilled workers will be higher in poor countries (where skilled workers are scarce) than
in rich countries (where they are abundant), while unskilled wages will be higher in rich countries than in
poor countries: we have (in real terms) wS
P > wS
R, but wUS
R > wUS
P. Thus, we should observe skilled
workers migrating from rich to poor countries, and unskilled workers migrating from poor to rich
countries. Immigration will hurt skilled workers in poor countries, but benefit the unskilled there;
therefore in poor countries the unskilled should favor immigration, while skilled workers should oppose
it. The situation is the reverse in rich countries: immigration will hurt the unskilled, but benefit skilled
workers. Thus skilled workers should be pro-immigration, while the unskilled should oppose it.
We thus have:
Prediction 1: the impact of skills on anti-immigrant sentiment should be related to a country’s GDP per
capita.
1 In the richest countries, being high-skilled should have a negative impact on anti-immigrant
sentiment. In the poorest countries, being  high-skilled should have a positive impact on anti-immigrant
sentiment. More generally, an interaction term between skills and GDP per capita should enter with a
negative sign in a regression explaining anti-immigrant sentiment.6
Note that in such a pure 2-country, 2-factor Heckscher-Ohlin world, in which countries are
distinguished solely by their relative factor endowments, agents are consistent in their attitudes towards
globalization. That is, in rich countries skilled workers favor both trade and immigration, while unskilled
workers are protectionist and anti-immigration. In poor countries, it is the unskilled who are liberal in
their attitudes towards both trade and immigration, while the skilled favor both protection and
immigration restrictions. This symmetry reflects the fact that in a pure 2-factor Heckscher-Ohlin world in
which technology is identical across countries, trade and factor flows are substitutes: they have identical
effects on factor prices (i.e. they both lead to relative and absolute factor price convergence), and thus the
more you have of one dimension of globalization, the less incentive there will be for the other dimension
to take place. In such a world, scarce factors lose as a result of either trade or immigration, while
abundant factors gain from either. One immediate political consequence of the fact that trade and
migration are substitutes for each other is that agents who are protectionist should also be anti-
immigration: both trade and immigration have to be simultaneously restricted, since either phenomenon
will hurt the scarce factor. Protection without immigration restrictions will not work, since protection
without immigration restrictions will simply lead to more immigration; immigration barriers without
protection will not work, since immigration barriers on their own will simply lead to more trade (Mundell
1957).
We thus have:
Prediction 2: ceteris paribus, being protectionist should increase the likelihood that an individual is anti-
immigrant; while ceteris paribus, being anti-immigrant should increase the likelihood that an individual
is protectionist.
Things get a lot more complicated if technology differs across countries, or if there are more than2  Furthermore, it is no longer the case that trade and factor flows are necessarily substitutes: they
could instead be complements. For example, Markusen (1983) shows that technological differences
between countries can lead to trade and factor mobility being complements; while in the context of a
three-factor model such as the specific factors model, trade and factor mobility can be either substitutes
or complements (O’Rourke and Williamson 1999, Chapter 13).
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two factors of production. Any test of Heckscher-Ohlin theory will in all likelihood do better by
admitting such possibilities. If technology is better in the rich country, or if the rich country is better
endowed with some third factor of production than the poor country, then it no longer follows from an
inequality such as (wS/wUS)
R < (wS/wUS)
P that skilled workers will migrate from rich to poor countries: it
is quite possible that  (wS/wUS)
R < (wS/wUS)
P, but that (in real terms) wS
R > wS
P. In this case, skilled
workers will move from poor (unskilled labor abundant) countries to rich (skill abundant) countries:
unskilled workers will move in the same direction as skilled workers. This is, of course, what happens in
the real world, reflecting the fact that richer countries do indeed enjoy superior technology to poor
countries, and that endowments alone cannot explain differences in income, or for that matter trade
patterns and factor flows. The issue of whether skilled or unskilled workers should be more anti-
immigration in rich countries thus becomes unclear. Presumably it depends upon whether immigration
predominantly involves skilled or unskilled workers; but which is true is not immediately obvious.
2
In fact, there is a large theoretical literature which asks whether migrants are more likely to be
skilled or unskilled, but this literature tends not to be located within standard HO trade models. For
example, Katz and Stark (1984) argue that asymmetric information can lead to migration flows
disproportionately involving unskilled workers, since employers in rich countries may not be able to
correctly discern the skill levels of potential migrants; although the equilibrium outcome can change if
various devices reinstating informational symmetry are employed (Katz and Stark 1987). While
appealing, it is not clear to us how this theory could be empirically tested with the data at our disposal.
An alternative theory is provided by Borjas (1987), who adapts Roy’s (1951) model of
occupational self-selection to the issue of migration. The conclusion of the analysis is that there will be3 In principle, self-selection should depend not only on income distribution within host countries,
but on the relationship between host country and source country income distribution. A complete test of
the Borjas theory would thus involve calculating source country distributions for each host country. In
this paper we make the simplifying assumption that source country distributions are sufficiently similar
for all host countries that self-selection varies across host countries based on differences in host country
distributions alone.
4 This section largely draws on O’Rourke and Sinnott (2001).
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positive self-selection of migrants if (a) the correlation between the earnings which they receive in the
home and destination countries is sufficiently high; and (b) if income is more dispersed in the destination
country than in the home country. On the other hand, there will be negative self-selection if (a) the
correlation between the earnings which they receive in the home and destination countries is sufficiently
high; and (b) if income is less dispersed in the destination country than in the home country. The theory
thus predicts that immigrants into more unequal countries should be higher-skilled than immigrants into
more equal countries: it follows that the high-skilled should be less favorably disposed towards
immigrants in more unequal countries than in more equal countries. We have:
Prediction 3: the impact of skills on anti-immigrant sentiment should be related to a country’s level of
inequality. In the most unequal countries, being high-skilled should have a positive impact on anti-
immigrant sentiment. In the most equal countries, being  high-skilled should have a negative impact on
anti-immigrant sentiment. More generally, an interaction term between skills and inequality should enter
with a positive sign in a regression explaining anti-immigrant sentiment.
3
Section 3. Data
4
What do we need to accomplish our objectives? We need a data set that provides information on
individuals’ attitudes towards immigration, socio-economic position, socio-demographic characteristics
and political attitudes. Since the Borjas and HO models predict that skill levels will have different5 Full details on the ISSP consortium, including details on participating institutions, procedures,  
availability of datasets and technical reports can be obtained at http://www.issp.org/info.htm
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implications for trade policy preferences in different countries, the data should be cross-national in
scope.
What we have are data provided by the 1995 International Social Survey Programme (ISSP)
module on national identity. The ISSP national identity survey was conducted in twenty-four countries in
1995-96. The countries concerned were: Australia, West Germany, East Germany, Great Britain, the
USA, Austria, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the Czech Republic, Slovenia,
Poland, Bulgaria, Russia, New Zealand, Canada, the Phillippines, Japan, Spain, Latvia and Slovakia.
5
The ISSP survey asked respondents two questions that bear on their attitude towards
immigration. The first asked if the number of immigrants to their economy should be increased a lot (1),
a little (2), remain the same (3), be reduced a little (4) or reduced a lot (5). The second asked if refugees
should be allowed to stay in the country; responses ran from agree strongly (1) to disagree strongly (5). 
Table 1 reports the mean response to these questions in each country, where countries are ordered
according to the mean value of their response to the question on immigration. (A separate column reports
the ranking of countries according to their mean response to the question on refugees.) Scores greater
than 3 indicate that on average respondents were leaning towards greater restriction. As can be seen,
individuals tended to be more strongly opposed to immigration in general than to refugees, suggesting
that the interviewees were making a distinction between forced migration due to political repression and
migration more generally. Sample respondents in every country on average favoured lowering the
number of immigrants; by contrast, the mean response to the refugee question only exceeded 3 in five
countries (Slovenia, the Phillippines, Japan, Latvia and Slovakia).
The data set also provides individual-level measures of a range of demographic, socio-economic
and political variables. Among the socio-economic variables, the most valuable from the point of view of10
testing the implications of the theories we surveyed earlier is the respondent’s skill level. This is arrived
at by coding the answers to questions on respondents’ occupation using the International Labour
Organisation’s ISCO88 (International Standard Classification of Occupations) coding scheme. ISCO88 is
a radical revision of the ILO’s previous occupational coding scheme (ISCO68). The main thrust of the
revision makes ISCO88 particularly relevant for our purposes. As Ganzeboom and Treiman put it, ‘… the
logic of the classification is mostly derived from skill requirements at the expense of industry
distinctions’ and the overall effort may ‘be seen as an attempt to introduce more clear-cut skill
distinctions into ISCO88’ (Ganzeboom and Treiman 1996, p. 206). While a complex coding scheme of
this sort allows for very fine distinctions between different occupations, we are interested in the four
main skill categories provided by ISCO88. In brief, these are: (1) ‘elementary occupations’ (i..e. ‘manual
labor and simple and routine tasks, involving…with few exceptions, only limited personal initiative’
(ILO 1990, p.7)); (2) ‘plant and machine operators and assemblers; craft and related trades workers;
skilled agricultural and fishery workers; service workers and shop and market sales workers; clerks;’ (3)
‘technicians and associate professionals;’ and (4) ‘professionals.’ A fifth group, ‘legislators, senior
officials and managers,’ do not have a skill coding under this four-step skill classification and were
included as a separate, fifth, skill category. Finally, we excluded members of the armed forces, since it
was unclear what their skill levels were. 
Unfortunately, application of the ISCO coding schemes in the 1995 ISSP was somewhat uneven:
the survey coded occupation in three different ways, depending on the country in question. The ISCO88
coding scheme was used in 12 cases, the earlier ISCO68 scheme was used in 6 cases and a further 6
countries used a variety of national coding schemes. However, we were able to construct an
approximation to the ISCO88 skill classification either by recoding the ISCO68 data or, in three cases
(Britain, the Netherlands, and the Philippines) by  recoding the country-specific occupational codes. This6 The three countries omitted when estimating models involving skill are Italy, Japan, and
Sweden.
7 Details available on request.
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provided us with skill data for 21 of our 24 countries.
6
We also make use of a subjective economic variable, namely the stated willingness of people to
move from one location to another in order to improve their standard of living or their work environment.
Respondents were asked: “If you could improve your work or living conditions, how willing or unwilling
would you be to move to another neighbourhood or village; another town or city within this county or
region; another county or region; outside [named country]; outside [named continent]?” Based on the
responses to these questions, we derived two binary variables, indicating whether or not individuals were
nationally mobile, and internationally mobile.
7 Arguably, those willing to relocate within the country
should be more sanguine about the dislocation implied by immigration than those who are immobile. This
will be particularly true if immigrants tend to concentrate in particular regions or cities. The rationale
behind including the international mobility variable is that people who view themselves as potential
emigrants may see migration as an opportunity rather than as a threat. Alternatively, being willing to live
overseas may signal an openness to other cultures, and hence a greater tolerance for immigrants. By the
same token, we also make use of a question which asks whether the respondent had ever lived abroad, on
the basis that previous experience of living abroad may provide a signal regarding willingness to move
again, as well as familiarity with foreigners. In addition, we have information on respondents’ age; their
gender; their religion; on whether they and their parents are native born or not; on their marital status;
and on a variety of other personal characteristics and attitudes.
The ISSP national identity data set includes a wide range of indicators of nationalist attitudes.
Rather than focussing on just one or two of these as indicators of what is, after all, a complex
phenomenon, the approach taken here is to seek to identify an underlying dimension (or dimensions) of12
nationalism that would be measured by a subset (or subsets) of the items. We focus on the following
seven questions (versions implemented in Ireland, other country/nationality labels substituted as
appropriate): 
• “Generally speaking, Ireland is a better country than most other countries”
• “The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the Irish”
• “I would rather be a citizen of Ireland than of any other country in the world”
• “It is impossible for people who do not share Irish customs and traditions to become fully Irish”
• “People should support their country even if the country is in the wrong”
• “Ireland should follow its own interests, even if this leads to conflicts with other nations”
• “How important do you think each of the following is for being truly Irish?”... ... ...“to have been
born in Ireland”
In each case, respondents were asked to rank their responses along a scale, in the case of the first
six items, from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) and, in the case of the seventh item, from 1
(very important) to 4 (not at all important). The seventh item was reordered to make it consistent with the
other six. Principal components analysis of these responses yielded two factors or underlying dimensions
of nationalist attitudes. As can be seen from the rotated factor loadings in Table 2, the first factor is a
straightforward preference for and sense of the superiority of one’s own country (here labelled
patriotism). The second factor identifies a narrow or exclusive sense of nationality combined with a
degree of chauvinism of the “my country right or wrong” variety (here labelled chauvinism). On the basis
of this analysis, patriotism and chauvinism scores have been calculated by averaging responses across the8 The Cronbach's alpha reliability coefficient for the three-item patriotism scale is 0.68 and the item-total
correlations vary from 0.41 to 0.57. The four-item ethnic chauvinism scale is somewhat less satisfactory in
this regard: an alpha of 0.53 and inter-item correlations ranging from 0.31 to 0.36.
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relevant subsets of items identified in the factor analysis.
8 
Section 4. Results
Table 3 presents the results of a series of regressions explaining ‘anti-immigrant’, which is an
ordered variable running from 1 (least anti-immigrant) to 5 (most anti-immigrant). The first equation
shows that nationalist sentiment is an extremely strong determinant of attitudes towards immigration,
with patriotism, and especially chauvinism, having a large positive effect on anti-immigrant sentiment.
This result is robust across all specifications, and confirms the importance of ideology in determining
attitudes towards globalization, a key result which O’Rourke and Sinnott (2001) obtained when analyzing
attitudes towards trade. It is not the case, according to these results, that economics alone shapes voters’
preferences regarding international economic integration. To this extent, these results are inconsistent
with those obtained by Timmer and Williamson for the late 19
th century; although it should be stressed
that the results are not strictly speaking comparable, since Timmer and Williamson analyze the
determinants of policy outcomes rather than of preferences.
Equation (2) tests the unconditional version of Prediction 1, and the results are not favorable to
Heckscher-Ohlin theory: the coefficient on the interaction term between Skill345 and GDP per capita is
negative, as expected, but the effect is statistically insignificant. Similarly, equation (3) tests the
unconditional version of Prediction 3, and again the results are disappointing for the Borjas self-selection
theory. The coefficient on an interaction term between Skill345 and the Gini coefficient is positive, as
expected, but again insignificant. In this equation, the coefficient on high skills becomes negative,
indicating that the high-skilled are less anti-immigrant than the low-skilled, ceteris paribus. This result,
which is consistent with that of Scheve and Slaughter (2001a) for the US, holds good for all remaining14
specifications (although the coefficient is insignificant at conventional levels in equation (4)). However,
as stressed earlier it is the interaction terms between Skill345 and GDP per capita and inequality that are
crucial for testing the hypotheses developed earlier.
Equation (4) tests a conditional version of Prediction 1, and this time the results are favorable.
Controlling for international differences in income distribution the interaction term between Skill345 and
GDP per capita is negative and statistically significant, just as theory predicts. Moreover, controlling for
international income differentials, the interaction term between Skill345 and the Gini coefficient becomes
more positive, although it remains statistically insignificant in this specification, with a p-value of 0.135.
The conditional version of Prediction 3 is however confirmed when further individual-level control
variables are added in equations (5) and (6), with the interaction effect between Skill345 and the Gini
coefficient becoming positive and statistically significant (although the coefficient on the interaction term
between Skill345 and GDP per capita becomes statistically insignificant at conventional levels in
equation 6 (with a p-value of 0.121).
How strong are these effects? Taking the specification in equation (5), and setting all the
explanatory variables equal to their median values, yields an expected probability of the most anti-
immigrant response of 48.7%. Assuming that the Gini coefficient is held at its median value, 31.6, being
high-skilled reduces the expected probability of the most anti-immigrant response by 3.2% at a per capita
income of $5000, but by 5.8% at per capita incomes of $15000, and by 8.4% at per capita incomes of
$25000. Assuming that per capita income is held constant, at its median value for this sample of countries
of $19270, being high-skilled reduces the expected probability of the most anti-immigrant response by
8.8% when the Gini coefficient is 25, by 5.9% when the Gini coefficient is 35, and by only 3.1% when
the Gini coefficient is 45. The net impact of being high-skilled is positive for Gini coefficients of 56 and9 These results were calculated using the CLARIFY programme described in Tomz, Wittenberg
and King (1999) and King, Tomz and Wittenberg (2000).
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over. The results are thus economically as well as statistically significant.
9
National mobility is unrelated to attitudes to globalization, but a stated willingness to move
internationally, or a history of such mobility, reduces the probability that a respondent will express anti-
immigrant opinions. Both natives and the children of natives are more anti-immigrant, as are older
people. Being a woman or a Roman Catholic does not have a statistically significant impact on
preferences; neither does being unemployed, which seems surprising.
Finally, equation (6) tests Prediction 2, by including ‘protect’ as an additional explanatory
variable; protect is an ordered variable describing respondents’ attitudes towards trade protection,
running from 1 (least protectionist) to 5 (most protectionist). Protectionism is positively and statistically
significantly correlated with anti-immigrant sentiment, just as Heckscher-Ohlin theory would predict, and
none of the other coefficients of particular interest to us change dramatically in size (although, as noted
above, the interaction term between Skill345 and GDP per capita becomes statistically insignificant).
Another approach to testing the Heckscher-Ohlin and self-selection theories is to run a series of
regressions explaining attitudes towards immigration in individual countries, and compare the
coefficients on Skill345 across countries. Appendix Table 1 gives the results of doing this using the
specification in equation (5) (without country dummies or the two interaction terms). Figure 1 plots the
resultant coefficients on Skill345 for each country, against that country’s level of GDP per capita. As can
be seen, support for the HO predictions is in this case unclear. There is indeed a negative relationship
between the coefficient on Skill345 and per capita GDP for the poorer countries in the sample (i.e. the
Phillippines and the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe); and in two of the poorest
countries, Latvia and the Phillippines, the impact of skills on anti-immigrant attitudes is actually positive.
However, for the richer countries in the sample the relationship is unclear. The overall correlation16
between the two variables is -0.343. This methodology provides stronger evidence for the Borjas theory:
Figure 1 shows a positive relationship between the Skill345 coefficient and the Gini coefficient (with a
correlation of 0.401). 
Of course, Figure 1 just plots the bivariate relationship between the Skill345 coefficient and GDP
per capita; while the regressions in Table 3 control for a simultaneous relationship between the Skill345
coefficient and inequality. It appears that the evidence for the predictions of Heckscher-Ohlin theory is
weak when the unconditional version of that theory is tested; however, conditional on other factors the
predictions of the theory hold up well. The Borjas theory does better than factor proportions theory when
tested unconditionally, but does even better yet when tested conditional on other factors.
Of necessity, these exercises all rely on average correlations, and correlation is not necessarily
causation. It would be nice to know, for example, if the results involving our skill variable do indeed
reveal labour market forces at work, which is what our discussion of the Heckscher-Ohlin and Borjas
theories assumed, or whether the correlations are purely spurious. One attempt to resolve this issue is
presented in the first two columns of Table 4, which replicate the specification in column 5 of Table 3,
but which split the sample into two groups: those in the labour force, and those outside it. As can be seen
from the table, the conclusions regarding skill levels, income per capita and inequality all carry over in
the case where only labour force participants are considered (column 1), and indeed the three relevant
coefficients are all bigger than the corresponding coefficients in the previous table. However, all three
coefficients are much smaller, and statistically insignificant, when only persons outside the labour force
are included in the regression (column 2). By contrast, the coefficients on patriotism and chauvinism are
almost as big for non-labour force participants as for those in the labour force; while the age effect
uncovered in Table 3 seems only to hold for non-labour force participants. These results are all consistent
with the hypothesis that labour force participants’ attitudes are shaped by economic as well as non-
economic factors, and that the Heckscher-Ohlin and Borjas findings of Table 3 indeed reflect the17
workings of labour markets; while the attitudes of non-labour force participants are more determined by
non-economic factors.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 further split the sample, this time geographically. Column 3
considers western economies, while column 4 considers the former communist economies of eastern
Europe. As can be seen, there are several interesting differences in the results for these two groups of
countries. Chauvinism is a much bigger factor shaping western attitudes, whereas being a native-born
resident, and having native-born parents, is more important in the east. Age matters in the west but not in
the east. Most strikingly, the coefficient on skills is extremely large in the west, but insignificant in the
east, consistent with Heckscher-Ohlin theory. Within the two blocks, the Borjas theory shows up in the
western sample but not the eastern one; while the Heckscher-Ohlin effect shows up in the eastern sample
but not the western one (consistent with Figure 1).
Table 5 shows the results of a series of ordered probit regressions explaining attitudes towards
refugees, rather than immigrants in general. The dependent variable, anti-refugee, is an ordered variable
running from 1 (agree strongly with the statement that refugees should be allowed to stay in the country)
to 5 (disagree strongly). Results are given for the entire sample, as well as for labour force participants
and non-participants, and for the west and eastern Europe. As can be seen in column (2), the low-skilled
are more anti-refugee than the high-skilled when only labour force participants are considered; however,
this effect is constant across countries since both interaction terms involving skills are statistically
insignificant. Thus, the Heckscher-Ohlin and Borjas results do not carry over when only refugees are
being considered by respondents; indeed, column 3 shows that among non-labor force participants, these
interaction effects actually have the wrong sign. These results are consistent with a belief among labour
market participants that refugees are low-skilled (although in fact this may not necessarily be the case), in
which case it is the low-skilled who should be most opposed to their presence in all countries. The only
support for a Heckscher-Ohlin effect comes from a comparison between columns 4 and 5, which show10 See Greene (2000), pp. 849-856. The interaction term between Skill345 and the Gini
coefficient is omitted from the equation explaining protectionism, since this interaction term tests the
Borjas self-selection theory of migration. As the discussion in Section 2 indicated, however, the
Heckscher-Ohlin interaction term between skills and GDP per capita does belong in the protectionism
equation.
11 It is important to note that Mayda (2003) has recently and independently arrived at similar
conclusions to these, using the same data set, as well as the World Values Survey, but employing many
additional individual- and country-level variables to test the basic Heckscher-Ohlin predictions. She uses
both education and skills as measures of human capital, and runs probit regressions explaining a
dichotomous ‘immigrant opinion’ variable. Her results are even more favorable for factor proportions
theory than ours, even though she does not correct for differences in inequality across countries. The
findings in this section regarding Heckscher-Ohlin theory thus appear to be robust.
18
that the low-skilled are very much more anti-refugee in the west, but not in the poorer east.
Finally, Table 6 looks again at Prediction 2, and tackles one possible objection to the results in
Table 3, which is that ‘protectionism’ is not an exogenous variable, but rather an endogenous variable
determined by the same forces as ‘anti-immigrant’. Table 6 therefore presents the results of seemingly
unrelated bivariate probit regressions explaining attitudes towards both trade and immigration. It
estimates two regressions with the same explanatory variables as before, but allows the disturbance terms
in both regressions to be correlated with each other.
10 The dependent variables in both cases are binary
variables, indicating whether the respondent gave the most anti-globalization response possible: ‘Highly
protectionist’ is 1 if ‘protectionism’ = 5, while ‘Highly anti-immigrant’ is 1 if ‘anti-immigrant’ = 5;
otherwise both variables are zero.   The ‘rho’ coefficient reported at the bottom is the correlation between
the disturbances in the two equations, or ‘(roughly) the correlation between the outcomes after the
influence of the included factors is accounted for’ (Greene 2000, p. 854). The results confirm Prediction
2 in that ‘rho’ is strongly positive. Predictions 1 and 3 are also confirmed, in that the interaction terms
between ‘Skill345' and GDP per capita are negative, while the interaction term between ‘Skill345' and the
Gini coefficient in equation (2) is positive, albeit insignificant at conventional levels (with a p-value of
0.154). Broadly speaking the results are similar to those obtained earlier.
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Section 6. Conclusions
There are three main conclusions of this paper. The first is that attitudes towards immigration are
not a function of economic interests alone; rather, they also reflect nationalist sentiment among
respondents. This conclusion, which mirrors that of O’Rourke and Sinnott (2001) for attitudes towards
commodity trade, is important: objections to globalization rooted in ideology may be less easy to deal
with than objections rooted in interests, since the latter can in principle be dealt with through a variety of
complementary policies, such as side-payments of various kinds, social safety nets, or educational and
training policies.
The second conclusion is that for labour market participants, standard economic theory does a
good job of predicting individual attitudes towards immigration. The high-skilled are less opposed to
immigration than the low-skilled, and this effect is greater in richer countries than in poorer countries,
consistent with Heckscher-Ohlin theory; and in more equal countries than in more unequal ones
(consistent with the Borjas theory of immigrant self-selection). On the other hand, non-economic factors
are much more important in determining the attitudes of those not in the labour force.20
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Table 1. Average sentiment regarding immigrants and refugees
Country Anti-immigrant Anti-refugee
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Rank Std. Dev.
Hungary 4.402 0.817 2.838  8  1.077 
E.  Germany 4.338 0.871 1.961  24  0.879 
W.  Germany 4.226 0.910 2.049  23  1.022 
Bulgaria 4.219 0.990 2.661  13  1.379 
Latvia 4.182 0.884 3.757  1  1.312 
Czech  Rep. 4.158 0.880 2.463  15  1.143 
Italy 4.151 0.900 2.846  7  1.269 
Britain 4.052 0.962 2.820  9  1.100 
Slovakia 4.004 0.911 3.021  4  1.258 
Sweden 3.961 1.017 2.275  20  1.074 
Slovenia 3.939 0.868 3.565  3  1.103 
Poland 3.888 1.060 2.535  14  1.144 
USA 3.873 1.044 2.748  11  1.098 
Norway 3.847 0.982 2.340  19  0.990 
Netherlands 3.826 0.924 2.366  18  1.044 
Austria 3.804 0.933 2.095  22  1.111 
Phillippines 3.796 1.102 3.708  2  1.000 
Australia 3.768 1.042 2.954  6  1.202 
New  Zealand 3.742 1.053 2.807  10  1.075 
Russia 3.717 0.971 2.698  12  1.242 
Spain 3.401 0.813 2.460  16  1.036 
Japan 3.391 1.008 3.014  5  1.296 
Canada 3.317 1.135 2.404  17  1.129 
Ireland 3.071 0.829 2.163  21  0.911 
Source:  Data from ISSP National Identity Survey 199524
Table 2.  Factor analysis of nationalist items in ISSP National Identity Survey 1995
Factor 1 Factor 2
[COUNTRY] better country than most other countries 0.86 0.02
World better place if people from other countries more like the 0.78 0.2
Rather be citizen of [COUNTRY] than of any other country in world 0.61 0.29
Impossible for people who do not share [NATNL.]traditions to be fully -0.01 0.71
People should support their country even if country is wrong 0.20 0.63
Importance of having been born in [COUNTRY] to be fully [NATIONALITY] 0.16 0.63
[COUNTRY] should follow own interests, even if conflicts with other nations 0.23 0.55
Percent variance 26.34 24.50
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser
Normalization.
Source: O’Rourke and Sinnott (2001).   Data from ISSP National Identity Survey 1995.Table 3. Determinants of anti-immigrant preferences (ordered probit)
(dependent variable: anti-immigrant)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Patriotism 0.1090*** 0.1063*** 0.1052*** 0.1060*** 0.0874*** 0.0686***
[0.0193] [0.0195] [0.0195] [0.0194] [0.0146] [0.0142]
Chauvinism 0.3606*** 0.3503*** 0.3517*** 0.3505*** 0.3307*** 0.2939***
[0.0461] [0.0452] [0.0452] [0.0453] [0.0484] [0.0471]
Skill345 -0.0549 -0.3340* -0.2643 -0.2746* -0.3015*
[0.0705] [0.1723] [0.1767] [0.1619] [0.1539]
Skill345*GDPCAP -0.0060 -0.0071* -0.0066* -0.0059
[0.0047] [0.0041] [0.0038] [0.0038]
Skill345*Inequality 0.0056 0.0070 0.0072* 0.0082**
[0.0052] [0.0047] [0.0042] [0.0041]
National mobility -0.0236 -0.0221
[0.0185] [0.0185]
International 
mobility
-0.0751** -0.0627**
[0.0297] [0.0307]
Never lived abroad 0.1239*** 0.1108***
[0.0274] [0.0277]
Native 0.1563** 0.1578**
[0.0650] [0.0665]
Native parents 0.1849** 0.1867***
[0.0726] [0.0688]
Age 0.0066*** 0.0060***
[0.0022] [0.0023]
Age squared -0.0000** -0.0000*
[0.0000] [0.0000]
Female 0.0484* 0.0222
[0.0264] [0.0250]
Married 0.0068 0.0052
[0.0205] [0.0204]
Catholic -0.0235 -0.0278
[0.0409] [0.0409]
Unemployed 0.0384 0.0284
[0.0487] [0.0487]
Protectionism 0.1218***
[0.0115]
Cut1 -1.0700*** -1.1354*** -1.1659*** -1.1557*** -0.7094*** -0.4971***
[0.1347] [0.1311] [0.1252] [0.1262] [0.1384] [0.1423]
Cut2 -0.3720*** -0.4369*** -0.4674*** -0.4570*** 0.0006 0.2165
[0.1356] [0.1318] [0.1248] [0.1268] [0.1302] [0.1377]
Cut3 0.8796*** 0.8176*** 0.7867*** 0.7976*** 1.2865*** 1.5122***
[0.1293] [0.1278] [0.1206] [0.1227] [0.1398] [0.1454]
Cut4 1.6979*** 1.6378*** 1.6069*** 1.6179*** 2.1144*** 2.3470***
[0.1426] [0.1411] [0.1341] [0.1365] [0.1457] [0.1518]
No. of observations 26484 26484 26484 26484 24382 24349
Log likelihood -32707.20 -32660.46 -32661.54 -32657.10 -29775.11 -29574.14
Pseudo-R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08
Robust standard errors in brackets assume clustering at country level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***
significant at 1%. Country dummy variables included; coefficients not reported.26
Table 4. Sensitivity analysis (ordered probit)
(dependent variable: anti-immigrant)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample In labour force Not in labour force West Eastern Europe
Patriotism 0.0908*** 0.0823*** 0.0980*** 0.0781***
[0.0189] [0.0147] [0.0229] [0.0194]
Chauvinism 0.3372*** 0.3144*** 0.4422*** 0.1682***
[0.0505] [0.0477] [0.0529] [0.0358]
Skill345 -0.3176* -0.2143 -0.7205*** -0.0019
[0.1704] [0.2775] [0.2347] [0.1147]
Skill345*GDPCAP -0.0086* -0.0045 -0.0012 -0.0182**
[0.0046] [0.0047] [0.0116] [0.0082]
Skill345*Inequality 0.0089** 0.0052 0.0179*** -0.0001
[0.0045] [0.0081] [0.0055] [0.0023]
National mobility -0.0439** 0.0084 -0.0481*** 0.0245
[0.0213] [0.0334] [0.0165] [0.0481]
International  mobility -0.0716** -0.0770* -0.1024*** 0.0505
[0.0348] [0.0410] [0.0321] [0.0351]
Never lived abroad 0.1464*** 0.0878* 0.1189*** 0.0906**
[0.0366] [0.0480] [0.0386] [0.0365]
Native 0.1498** 0.1697* 0.0798 0.3779***
[0.0712] [0.0925] [0.0734] [0.0925]
Native parents 0.1762** 0.1940** 0.1584* 0.3022***
[0.0776] [0.0832] [0.0920] [0.1134]
Age -0.0005 0.0152*** 0.0081*** 0.0039
[0.0061] [0.0029] [0.0025] [0.0042]
Age squared 0.0000 -0.0001*** -0.0001*** 0
[0.0001] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
Female 0.0346 0.0686** 0.0553 0.0628
[0.0296] [0.0292] [0.0347] [0.0440]
Married 0.0226 -0.0141 0.0237 -0.018
[0.0299] [0.0207] [0.0267] [0.0233]
Catholic -0.0013 -0.0590 -0.1005* 0.0478
[0.0463] [0.0507] [0.0523] [0.0343]
Unemployed 0.0234 0.0068 0.0382
[0.0491] [0.0421] [0.0895]
Cut1 -0.9099*** -0.4646*** 0.6739*** -0.6212***
[0.1723] [0.1591] [0.1997] [0.1981]
Cut2 -0.1641 0.1915 1.4628*** -0.1051
[0.1483] [0.1503] [0.1881] [0.1817]
Cut3 1.1257*** 1.4771*** 2.7809*** 1.2381***
[0.1404] [0.1624] [0.2008] [0.2355]
Cut4 1.9547*** 2.3069*** 3.6574*** 2.0164***
[0.1365] [0.1734] [0.2138] [0.2136]
No. of observations 14369 10013 15669 7569
Log likelihood -17696.13 -12043.60 -19164.81 -8765.48
Pseudo-R-squared 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.05
Robust standard errors in brackets assume clustering at country level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***
significant at 1%. Country dummy variables included; coefficients not reported.27
Table 5. Determinants of attitudes towards refugees (ordered probit)
(dependent variable: anti-refugee)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample All In labour force Not in labour force West East
Patriotism 0.0411*** 0.0477** 0.0279 0.0346 0.0595***
[0.0159] [0.0185] [0.0193] [0.0230] [0.0209]
Chauvinism 0.2848*** 0.3014*** 0.2575*** 0.3966*** 0.1165***
[0.0428] [0.0457] [0.0425] [0.0448] [0.0296]
Skill345 -0.1226 -0.1942* 0.0868 -0.5428** -0.0662
[0.1105] [0.1121] [0.2429] [0.2127] [0.0860]
Skill345*GDPCAP -0.0005 -0.0046 0.0131*** 0.0028 0.0050
[0.0026] [0.0030] [0.0041] [0.0099] [0.0043]
Skill345*Inequality -0.0002 0.0039 -0.0145** 0.0107 -0.0038**
[0.0028] [0.0029] [0.0073] [0.0068] [0.0016]
National mobility -0.0557*** -0.0446* -0.0739*** -0.0773*** -0.0249
[0.0188] [0.0259] [0.0219] [0.0200] [0.0389]
International  mobility -0.1017*** -0.0763*** -0.1471*** -0.1086*** -0.0719
[0.0249] [0.0260] [0.0324] [0.0324] [0.0572]
Never lived abroad 0.0994*** 0.1253*** 0.0557 0.0907** 0.0788*
[0.0260] [0.0270] [0.0438] [0.0363] [0.0425]
Native 0.1055 0.1079* 0.1012 0.0262 0.2696***
[0.0779] [0.0639] [0.1095] [0.0970] [0.0752]
Native parents 0.0347 0.0136 0.0645 0.0765 -0.0431
[0.0526] [0.0555] [0.0755] [0.0703] [0.0893]
Age 0.0031 -0.0091* 0.0117*** 0.0039 0.0022
[0.0024] [0.0050] [0.0030] [0.0033] [0.0036]
Age squared -0.0001** 0.0001 -0.0001*** -0.0001* -0.0001
[0.0000] [0.0001] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
Female -0.0039 -0.0164 0.0184 -0.0368 0.0621*
[0.0279] [0.0292] [0.0286] [0.0397] [0.0347]
Married 0.0365* 0.0588*** 0.0063 0.0584* 0.0014
[0.0198] [0.0201] [0.0295] [0.0304] [0.0186]
Catholic 0.0143 0.0163 0.0079 -0.0125 0.0338
[0.0233] [0.0294] [0.0375] [0.0287] [0.0335]
Unemployed 0.0215 0.0083 0.0172 0.0020
[0.0331] [0.0313] [0.0439] [0.0457]
Cut1 -0.3138*** -0.5422*** -0.1502 0.1218 -0.4856***
[0.0900] [0.1170] [0.1309] [0.1149] [0.1551]
Cut2 0.8385*** 0.6166*** 1.0013*** 1.3617*** 0.5169***
[0.1095] [0.1303] [0.1363] [0.1338] [0.1631]
Cut3 1.5092*** 1.2852*** 1.6801*** 2.0667*** 1.1398***
[0.1182] [0.1343] [0.1455] [0.1398] [0.1658]
Cut4 2.2339*** 2.0148*** 2.4021*** 2.7785*** 1.8195***
[0.1279] [0.1555] [0.1461] [0.1427] [0.1902]
No. of observations 25422 15115 10307 16107 8162
Log likelihood -36003.65 -21301.86 -14635.70 -22044.89 -12127.10
Pseudo-R-squared 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.05
Robust standard errors in brackets assume clustering at country level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***
significant at 1%. Country dummy variables included; coefficients not reported.28
Table 6. Determinants of anti-globalization preferences
(seemingly unrelated bivariate probit)
(1) (2)
Dependent variable Highly protectionist Highly anti-immigrant
Patriotism 0.19152*** 0.08772***
[0.02031] [0.02037]
Chauvinism 0.36136*** 0.38800***
[0.02528] [0.04692]
Skill345 0.03990 -0.2086
[0.07152] [0.17127]
Skill345*GDPCAP -0.01374*** -0.00917**
[0.00394] [0.00376]
Skill345*Inequality 0.00569
[0.00399]
National mobility -0.03239 -0.00455
[0.02085] [0.01657]
International  mobility -0.00246 0.02777
[0.02928] [0.02616]
Never lived abroad 0.04579 0.0489
[0.03008] [0.03430]
Native 0.08425 0.20550**
[0.07771] [0.08936]
Native parents -0.06194 0.21724***
[0.06789] [0.07857]
Age 0.01541*** 0.01808***
[0.00447] [0.00297]
Age squared -0.00013*** -0.00016***
[0.00004] [0.00003]
Female 0.10829*** -0.02237
[0.02501] [0.02082]
Married 0.01291 -0.01405
[0.01779] [0.02120]
Catholic 0.05428** -0.00584
[0.02304] [0.02878]
Unemployed 0.10429*** 0.08990*
[0.03792] [0.05375]
Constant -2.79828*** -2.73641***
[0.15133] [0.15821]
No. of observations 27683 27683
Log likelihood -27489
Rho [standard error of rho] .2171996 [0.013274]
Wald test of rho = 0 chi2(1) =  251.006    Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Robust standard errors in brackets assume clustering at country level. * significant at 10%; ** significant
at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Country dummy variables included; coefficients not reported.-0.3 
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Figure 1. Impact of skill and GDP
Source: see text.-0.3 
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Figure 2. Impact of skill & inequality
Source: see text.Appendix Table 1. Country-specific regressions: anti-immigration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Australia West Germany East Germany Great Britain USA Austria
Patriotism 0.16911*** 0.12647** 0.15893* 0.09900 0.14712** 0.06338
[0.04216] [0.05576] [0.08534] [0.06279] [0.05786] [0.05389]
Chauvinism 0.44982*** 0.56896*** 0.48908*** 0.58406*** 0.20950*** 0.42313***
[0.03538] [0.05601] [0.07648] [0.05986] [0.04638] [0.05300]
Skill345 -0.18022*** -0.25948*** -0.16365 -0.13265 -0.07478 -0.10877
[0.05330] [0.09255] [0.14036] [0.08645] [0.07106] [0.09996]
National mobility 0.02237 0.03629 0.07002 -0.05445 0.00675 -0.20660**
[0.05514] [0.08783] [0.12248] [0.08888] [0.08328] [0.08512]
International mobility -0.00298 -0.20279** 0.13269 -0.10205 -0.31669*** -0.21891*
[0.06761] [0.09680] [0.18228] [0.10496] [0.09503] [0.12534]
Never lived abroad 0.24300*** -0.00193 0.33817 0.03145 0.11709 0.02144
[0.06356] [0.10808] [0.21750] [0.09705] [0.08765] [0.11455]
Native 0.00294 0.15722 -0.36466 0.03972 -0.29696 -0.15169
[0.14369] [0.30761] [0.85602] [0.26466] [0.23991] [0.30582]
Native parents 0.00761 0.40997 0.06330 0.14416 0.68860*** 0.20901
[0.13324] [0.27729] [0.71703] [0.25205] [0.22156] [0.27647]
Age -0.01578 0.01984 -0.01201 0.02289* 0.01772 0.01709
[0.01124] [0.01511] [0.02377] [0.01356] [0.01167] [0.01314]
Age squared 0.00009 -0.00022 0.00011 -0.00022* -0.00016 -0.00018
[0.00011] [0.00015] [0.00025] [0.00013] [0.00012] [0.00013]
Female 0.20915*** 0.06798 -0.00993 -0.11786 0.10914 -0.02831
[0.05201] [0.07711] [0.11171] [0.08026] [0.06817] [0.07438]
Married 0.06594 0.10188 0.10298 0.11756 0.01982 -0.04539
[0.06276] [0.09338] [0.13831] [0.08464] [0.06935] [0.08414]
Catholic -0.22994*** 0.00762 0.10961 -0.11248 -0.12328 -0.15872
[0.06123] [0.07735] [0.31225] [0.13227] [0.07871] [0.09740]
Unemployed 0.00931 0.42256 0.11990 -0.01022 -0.26910 -0.32069*
[0.16079] [0.30068] [0.18533] [0.16626] [0.18407] [0.18792]
Cut1 -0.65854** -0.23090 -1.14443 0.24454 0.04594 -0.88005**
[0.31792] [0.39908] [0.75797] [0.40505] [0.36431] [0.39941]
Cut2 0.25588 0.64485* -0.64952 0.85273** 0.58543 -0.15082
[0.31315] [0.37641] [0.73849] [0.39346] [0.35940] [0.38331]
Cut3 1.31030*** 2.04715*** 0.76161 2.39580*** 1.67540*** 1.68632***
[0.31323] [0.37628] [0.73061] [0.39831] [0.36026] [0.38356]
Cut4 2.23283*** 2.89508*** 1.52571** 3.15928*** 2.50303*** 2.43639***
[0.31515] [0.37991] [0.73191] [0.40220] [0.36369] [0.38607]
No. of observations 1831 963 478 870 1074 927
Log likelihood -2322.91 -970.49 -462.17 -959.05 -1381.60 -1061.30
Pseudo-R-squared 0.08 0.13 0.09 0.10 0.05 0.07
Note: Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at
1%.Appendix Table 1. Country-specific regressions: anti-immigration (continued)
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Hungary Italy Ireland Netherlands Norway Sweden
Patriotism 0.07861 0.08609* -0.03425 0.03307 0.13405*** 0.08223*
[0.05684] [0.04761] [0.05910] [0.03863] [0.05198] [0.04926]
Chauvinism 0.09088* 0.38009*** 0.26212*** 0.69693*** 0.64514*** 0.71788***
[0.05135] [0.05414] [0.05983] [0.04125] [0.04551] [0.04824]
Skill345 -0.18601** -0.00845 -0.12491** -0.23832***
[0.09114] [0.08645] [0.05757] [0.06618]
National mobility 0.02755 -0.07219 -0.23952*** -0.04184 -0.03268 0.00167
[0.08996] [0.08001] [0.08792] [0.05965] [0.06945] [0.07679]
International mobility 0.02420 -0.00761 -0.05138 -0.10149 -0.20683** -0.11991
[0.14167] [0.09258] [0.11186] [0.06762] [0.08722] [0.08617]
Never lived abroad 0.13013 0.07508 0.13559 0.00926 -0.08380 0.01529
[0.16019] [0.11423] [0.08430] [0.07741] [0.07889] [0.09184]
Native 0.44728 -0.18639 -0.20266 0.08225 0.35683 -0.62237**
[0.37698] [0.52814] [0.30151] [0.25312] [0.24627] [0.27857]
Native parents -0.03294 -0.66289** 0.00643 0.55404*** 0.23907 0.66484**
[0.33841] [0.32689] [0.24500] [0.20738] [0.20137] [0.25933]
Age 0.00146 -0.01006 -0.02420 0.00524 0.00721 0.00879
[0.01291] [0.01590] [0.01494] [0.01013] [0.01140] [0.01385]
Age squared 0.00000 0.00013 0.00028* -0.00003 -0.00007 -0.00016
[0.00013] [0.00017] [0.00015] [0.00011] [0.00012] [0.00015]
Female 0.13164* 0.08084 0.01605 0.01228 -0.08505 0.02052
[0.07900] [0.07098] [0.07560] [0.05364] [0.06130] [0.06763]
Married 0.02673 0.07759 0.06464 0.17115*** -0.18302** 0.04127
[0.08060] [0.08930] [0.08643] [0.06324] [0.07409] [0.07753]
Catholic -0.02217 0.07053 0.41109*** 0.12860* 0.17221 0.79884*
[0.08255] [0.16076] [0.15282] [0.06802] [0.48278] [0.47880]
Unemployed 0.12789 0.07113 0.07424 -0.19162 0.15711 -0.00865
[0.14805] [0.22370] [0.14547] [0.13805] [0.17759] [0.13118]
Cut1 -1.23544*** -1.89300*** -1.54398*** 0.13368 0.15771 0.20744
[0.47513] [0.59500] [0.48341] [0.30258] [0.34988] [0.38164]
Cut2 -0.97484** -1.29685** -0.40806 1.02205*** 1.14887*** 0.78438**
[0.46584] [0.58605] [0.47766] [0.29168] [0.34041] [0.37686]
Cut3 0.22506 -0.10634 1.32354*** 2.60473*** 2.52499*** 1.96774***
[0.45635] [0.58316] [0.47886] [0.29424] [0.34301] [0.37728]
Cut4 1.00803** 0.81077 2.04697*** 3.64598*** 3.50187*** 2.94868***
[0.45711] [0.58359] [0.48167] [0.29848] [0.34738] [0.38105]
No. of observations 937 1033 885 1744 1311 1105
Log likelihood -939.29 -1169.78 -1004.79 -1962.22 -1515.48 -1275.69
Pseudo-R-squared 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.12 0.13 0.12
Note: Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at
1%.Appendix Table 1. Country-specific regressions: anti-immigration  (continued)
(13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Czech Rep. Slovenia Poland Bulgaria Russia New Zealand
Patriotism 0.13404** 0.13650** 0.15439** 0.07865 0.05616 0.16221***
[0.05470] [0.05692] [0.06637] [0.05687] [0.04437] [0.05936]
Chauvinism 0.18948*** 0.33892*** 0.13378* 0.00298 0.11773*** 0.35354***
[0.05177] [0.05546] [0.06849] [0.06732] [0.04503] [0.05168]
Skill345 -0.29789*** -0.20132** -0.24886** -0.02521 -0.08189 -0.26017***
[0.08299] [0.08757] [0.10058] [0.10126] [0.08920] [0.08666]
National mobility 0.12011 0.10170 -0.01074 -0.37268*** 0.07293 -0.01627
[0.08170] [0.08401] [0.09045] [0.10049] [0.08603] [0.08490]
International mobility -0.18177 0.08298 0.12080 0.24535** 0.03809 -0.22544**
[0.12912] [0.12250] [0.11263] [0.11916] [0.11148] [0.09283]
Never lived abroad -0.12278 0.08123 0.21994* -0.02969 -0.05819 0.15165*
[0.12214] [0.09769] [0.13209] [0.13851] [0.16860] [0.08765]
Native -0.00036 0.21282 -0.09642 0.44768 0.21041 0.06602
[0.35124] [0.25614] [0.38615] [0.81370] [0.39801] [0.18840]
Native parents 0.05669 0.47250** 0.12779 0.68216** 0.08773 0.26197
[0.23447] [0.22881] [0.31164] [0.32692] [0.33980] [0.17050]
Age 0.01197 -0.00880 0.00744 0.01537 -0.00499 -0.00124
[0.01528] [0.01524] [0.01473] [0.01671] [0.01291] [0.01453]
Age squared -0.00010 0.00006 0.00003 -0.00006 0.00008 -0.00006
[0.00017] [0.00016] [0.00015] [0.00017] [0.00014] [0.00014]
Female 0.05340 -0.18093** 0.21303** 0.27815*** 0.13568** -0.02764
[0.07675] [0.07483] [0.08512] [0.09089] [0.06850] [0.07498]
Married -0.16379* -0.00413 0.03524 0.04345 0.01117 -0.00239
[0.09372] [0.09370] [0.09767] [0.10759] [0.07315] [0.08815]
Catholic -0.06296 0.12904 0.01755 -1.71805** 0.28302 -0.33116***
[0.08035] [0.09296] [0.12243] [0.73279] [0.74262] [0.10438]
Unemployed -0.10914 -0.31489** -0.09316 0.44412*** 0.25498** 0.34287*
[0.29184] [0.14691] [0.14945] [0.15734] [0.12884] [0.18840]
Cut1 -1.68936*** -0.90106** -0.26468 -0.07720 -1.11868** -0.50459
[0.49608] [0.41384] [0.51003] [0.85648] [0.43732] [0.43131]
Cut2 -0.96838** -0.32088 0.31455 0.31359 -0.49163 0.33818
[0.46369] [0.38735] [0.50520] [0.85313] [0.43186] [0.42541]
Cut3 0.44334 1.59519*** 1.40379*** 1.17814 0.70459 1.33487***
[0.45683] [0.38544] [0.50464] [0.85366] [0.43071] [0.42442]
Cut4 1.23021*** 2.50018*** 2.10289*** 1.99809** 1.61427*** 2.27161***
[0.45804] [0.38858] [0.50701] [0.85571] [0.43252] [0.42769]
No. of observations 886 932 718 672 1031 848
Log likelihood -992.49 -1028.82 -931.24 -753.32 -1360.55 -1095.52
Pseudo-R-squared 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.08
Note: Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at
1%.Appendix Table 1. Country-specific regressions: anti-immigration (continued)
(19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24)
Canada Phillippines Japan Spain Latvia Slovakia
Patriotism -0.05625 0.08890* 0.24603*** 0.06490 -0.03128 0.02844
[0.04578] [0.05194] [0.05410] [0.05398] [0.05740] [0.04767]
Chauvinism 0.49631*** -0.13085** 0.12611*** 0.14147** 0.27367*** 0.10933**
[0.04727] [0.05864] [0.04176] [0.05968] [0.05668] [0.04304]
Skill345 -0.19850*** 0.08338 -0.04489 0.07444 -0.09295
[0.07404] [0.15237] [0.10935] [0.11412] [0.08122]
National mobility 0.02894 0.05426 -0.15250** -0.03444 0.04834 0.12473*
[0.07955] [0.07093] [0.07644] [0.08071] [0.10276] [0.07318]
International mobility 0.01057 -0.22415*** -0.00582 0.02644 0.12334 -0.01008
[0.08345] [0.07754] [0.13074] [0.09552] [0.13468] [0.08752]
Never lived abroad 0.24456*** 0.23147* 0.58703*** -0.10172 0.14601 0.12282
[0.08125] [0.11941] [0.15386] [0.10570] [0.11592] [0.11865]
Native 0.38226** 0.17987 -0.08184 0.53180*** 0.74412**
[0.16651] [0.41108] [0.17692] [0.16954] [0.36225]
Native parents -0.21971 -0.22154 0.26512 0.36768 0.53756*** -0.05204
[0.14806] [0.29871] [0.62486] [0.29804] [0.14770] [0.20362]
Age 0.01100 0.01258 0.00228 0.01824 0.02211 0.02222
[0.01313] [0.01225] [0.01260] [0.01264] [0.01769] [0.01357]
Age squared -0.00010 -0.00013 0.00006 -0.00015 -0.00010 -0.00017
[0.00014] [0.00013] [0.00013] [0.00013] [0.00020] [0.00015]
Female 0.08761 -0.07729 0.34011*** -0.03792 -0.11010 0.00384
[0.06854] [0.06430] [0.06779] [0.06885] [0.09025] [0.06752]
Married 0.00996 -0.01373 0.06598 -0.08455 -0.11317 -0.04740
[0.07549] [0.07844] [0.09684] [0.08869] [0.09425] [0.07873]
Catholic -0.25889*** 0.12812 -0.95497** 0.23695* 0.08478 0.12327*
[0.07068] [0.08871] [0.40899] [0.12872] [0.10742] [0.06954]
Protectionism 0.14087 0.19580 -0.10182 0.01732 -0.14966 0.14954
[0.22122] [0.18116] [0.31614] [0.10835] [0.13949] [0.14583]
Cut1 -0.10124 -1.43392** 0.60265 -0.79253* -0.68150 -0.58331
[0.36951] [0.56045] [0.69951] [0.45672] [0.44664] [0.43369]
Cut2 0.62416* -0.86901 1.48999** 0.08518 1.79017*** -0.03203
[0.36725] [0.55764] [0.69772] [0.44615] [0.42075] [0.42426]
Cut3 1.80799*** 0.05347 2.81133*** 1.73544*** 2.42551*** 1.44115***
[0.36883] [0.55663] [0.70106] [0.44749] [0.42324] [0.42460]
Cut4 2.59660*** 0.79085 3.67319*** 2.80479*** 2.22016***
[0.37264] [0.55728] [0.70352] [0.45215] [0.42631]
No. of observations 1009 1144 1024 1045 813 1102
Log likelihood -1380.09 -1586.02 -1335.87 -1211.95 -758.86 -1318.47
Pseudo-R-squared 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.12 0.02
Note: Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at
1%.